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Comments
The Mystery of Justice Holmes
Perlie P. Fallon*
We have lived in an era of crusades, ideologies and causes.
We whose lives extend into a second generation look back on
causes and leaders of causes which were with us but not with
those of the second generation. Such is not the fate of Justice
Holmes. He continues, if only a subject of controversy. Two rea-
sons for the continuity are apparent at once. He wrote well:
"Worships language and forgives ... Everyone by whom it lives,"'
and he wrote on law and justice-universals which interest every-
one and which have inspired teachers from a time extending back
through Aristotle and Plato.
There is another reason for a continuing interest in Justice
Holmes. It is not so apparent in our era. Time may develop it
clear and sharp. We are conscious of it, though, through our in-
ability to classify Justice Holmes. Some regarded him as a liberal,
others have been sure that the Justice was a radical, and still
others treated the Justice as a source of social and political mis-
chief. This irritation may have found its source in the difficulty
that arises when we look for a category that fits. What later gen-
erations may see clear and sharp is an objectiveness of mind that
became notable in the Northern Securities litigation, and which
leaves Justice Holmes in our era as a man without a cause. I pro-
pose to develop this thought by comparisons and contrasts with men
who were working during that period; then I shall refer to the
quality in the Justice's work.
There is a uniqueness in every personality, but the men whom
we select here for comparison and contrast have a common quality
aside from the varieties in their personalities. That common qual-
ity is a desire to see things as they are, to probe into reality and
give it meaning: "the facts in their actual relations," the desire
*B. A. Clark University; LL.B. Columbia University; member of the Bar
of the Supreme Court of the United States, City of New York, and American
Bar Associations.
1 Auden, In Memory of W. B. Yeats (a poem), in Another Time (1940).
By permission of Random House, New York.
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"to select from this reality what is pertinent to ultimate interests
and can speak eloquently to the soul."2
The definition is broad enough to include men who work in
other fields than the law. It leads to the observer, to those of
intellectual curiosity. The first who comes to mind is Henry James,
a superb observer of life. We will need Benedetto Croce and George
Santayana in the field of philosophical thought. Since the age is
one of rapid technological development, Thorstein Veblen will be
necessary. In the field of the law there are Louis Brandeis and
Harlan Stone; the former once submitted a brief of the facts alone;
the latter, along with Justice Holmes, is a master of the common law.
We are not concerned here with the opinions which these men
held. They are not "just like" Justice Holmes. Their natures alone
interest us.
Henry James was a boyhood friend of Justice Holmes. The
quality in James that brings him close to Justice Holmes is that
aforementioned power to select from reality what is pertinent. The
American Scene is an example. James wrote it after revisiting
America only a few months. It is the power of factual notice and
factual co-relation at its best. When James summed up the novel-
ist's art, he wrote that the writer draws from experience, that ex-
perience is immense sensibility, a power to catch the whole from
the pattern. James has a greater sensibility than Justice Holmes.
James' is the poet's sensibility. Reason may play a larger part with
Justice Holmes. The approach to life over experience is, however,
there. We find in the opinions a statement of the facts which lead
to the conclusion; the conclusion and then the reasoning. Holmes
tells us an ounce of experience is worth a volume of logic. James
is the meditative observer, he does not need to act; Justice Holmes
is a participant in the passing scene of life. Both of these men are
teachers; their zeal spent itself in exposition.
Chief Justice Stone, a teacher and jurist, said: "Holmes was
one of the rare judges who never wrote anything that did not have
its value to the student of the law."'3 He spoke of "the work of
an artist like Holmes." Those prior quotations that I have used in
my definitions of a "common quality" are from Santayana. There
are some lines in Reason In Art which throw a light on Chief Justice
Stone's comment and bring to us a quality that was common to
Santayana and Justice Holmes: "A real thing, when all its pertinent
2 Santayana, Reason in Art. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
3 Letter from Chief Justice Stone to the author, March 24, 1939, by per-
mission of Mrs. Harlan Fisk Stone.
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natural associates are discerned, touches wonder, pathos, and beauty
on every side; the rational poet is one who, without feigning any-
thing unreal, perceives these momentous ties, and presents his
subject loaded with its whole fate, missing no source of worth
which is in it, no ideal influence which it may have."'4 Justice
Holmes could see "these momentous ties." He described this quality,
in the terms of his own art, as the contemplative vision of the
lawyer.
Benedetto Croce, in reflecting upon the relation between his-
tory and liberty, gave a practical result to this contemplative vision,
marking the distinction between knowing man and knowing how
to manage men: "The poet, the philosopher, and the historian
really know man, and from what they have seen in moments of
inspiration and in the peace of meditation, those ideals are born
which warm the heart and point the way of action."5
There is another man working in the period whom we must
consider, Thorstein Veblen. In an early Massachusetts dissent by
Justice Holmes we find this: "It is plain from the slightest con-
sideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of
industrial history, that free competition means combination.... 6
There we find objectivity of mind, the power to see things as they
are. We find many examples of the power as Justice Holmes con-
siders in his judicial work the economic expansion that marks the
period. Thorstein Veblen had a vast knowledge of social and eco-
nomic evolution. His special knowledge extended into the fields
and sources from which the technology developed. His greatest
insight was perhaps in the possible productivity of the machine and
the unbounded possibilities that science possessed. To him science
was alive. In his thought he related the handicraft era where
nothing appeared in the product of the handicraft but what was
present in the skill of the worker to the new technology where
nothing appeared in the effect but what was contained in the cause.
He abandoned abstract reasoning; he sought to understand the
changes that science was creating by the observation of causes.
There is in Justice Holmes the factual approach which Veblen used;
there is the relation of effects to causes. Both men rested on the
instinct of workmanship and impersonal usefulness. There is a
distinction, however, between Veblen and Justice Holmes. Veblen
is a man with a cause. He is the advocate of the industrial arts.
4 Santayana, Reason in Art. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
5 Croce, History as the Story of Liberty, translated from the Italian by
Sylvia Sprigge, George Allen & Unwin., Ltd., London.
6 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (dissent).
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The two men are different in their natures in that one is in a cause,
the other is outside it. "Only the free divine the laws. . . .The
causeless only know the cause."
The comparisons and contrasts with men who were working
in varied and different fields leaves us with the impression of a
quality of mind that was something more than objective. We may
say that there was "mastery to see things as they are." Now we
turn to consider Justice Holmes' work as a jurist. We turn to sig-
nifid-ation: "Idealization, to select from this reality what is perti-
nent." Justice Holmes' skill in the law was complete. We need only
refer back to Chief Justice Stone's comment that all might learn
from anything which Justice Holmes wrote. I have analyzed the
professional part of the work elsewhere. Now there is a different
task: namely, to find the spirit which animated the work.
The spirit that I find there leads me to a comparison with
William Blake. S. Foster Damon once summed up Blake's thought:
"To acquire Truth, one must cast out Error. Error consists of all
Illusions, Prohibitions, and Negations, which of their very nature
have no real existence. A Contrary, as Blake warns us, is not a
Negation, but a positive thing. Contraries must be reconciled; for
if one Contrary is rejected, the domination of its fellow ensues,
and Truth is divided."7 The reconciliation of contradictories is the
mission of the law and the basis of jurisprudence. Chief Justice
White makes the relation clear in the memorial to Justice Lamar:
.. .society... which in its very essence embodies the complex
resultants of all the activities of human life, giving rise to the
corresponding duty to harmonize and adjust them to each other so
that they all might live and develop for the blessing and advance-
ment of mankind."8
The point that interests us in respect to Justice Holmes is the
application which he made of this thought in his judicial work.
We will be able to find the reflection of this thought best if we
first look at the opinions for examples of the thought in its larger
application; then we may turn to discussions of the economic life
of our country and finally to the relations between the individual
and the state.
We will take first, therefore, some excerpts from his opinions:
It constantly is necessary to reconcile and to adjust different
constitutional principles, each of which would be entitled to
7 Damon, William Blake, His Philosophy and Symbols. Constable & Co.,
Ltd., London.
8 241 U.S. XVI, XVIII (1916).
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possession of the disputed ground but for the presence of the others,
as we already have said that it is necessary to reconcile and to
adjust different principles of the common law. 9
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of the
principles of policy which are other than those on which the partic-
ular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached. 10
When, as in this matter, the Constitution takes from the States
only a portion of their otherwise absolute control, there may be
expected difficulties in drawing the dividing line, because where it
shall be put is a question of more or less. The trouble is inherent
in the situation, but it is the same in kind that meets us everywhere
else in the law. 11
I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that
my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does
so as soon as it is civilized... and between the variations according
to distance that I suppose to exist and the simple universality of
the rules in the Twelve Tables or the Leges Barbarorum, there lies
the culture of two thousand years. 12
These sentences are far beyond subtlety and expediency. They re-
flect the law as a spirit of reconciliation. Thorstein Veblen referred
to "those quasi-scientific articles of metaphysics that lie at the root
of the legal system." These sentences which I have taken from
Holmes' opinions rise above technical distinctions to a reconciling
and understanding wisdom and we find there a reflection of the law
of nations of the Eighteenth Century: "Less of the juridical, in
the strict sense of the word, than a moral aspiring after an era of
wisdom, of justice, of humanity . . . a religion almost, which at
certain times was capable of being transformed into ecstacy, into
a courage, and into prophetic vision.... ",I3 Here also is Goethe's
''principle of reasonable order that we hear within ourselves and
could impress as the seal of our power upon everything that we
touch."
Blake's thought, the reconciliation of contradictories, is also
present in Justice Holmes' discussions of the economic processes of
our country. He lifts us there from conflict to reconciliation. There
we find more than objectiveness in the presence of the emerging
9 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
10 Id. at 355.
11 Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 138 (1911).
12Le Roy Fibre Co. v. Chicago Mil. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914)
(concurring opinion).
13 Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, Talleyrand and the Congress of
Vienna, 1814-1815 (1941). G. P. Putnam's Sons.
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problems; there we find the understanding of the factors which are
at work. Early he pointed out that competition meant combination;
later he noted the rising tide of the police power. The Blake thought
is present in the opinion where Justice Holmes wrote that the eco-
nomic life of the country could not proceed as a war of every man
against every other man;14 it is present in the calm belief in the
capacity of our people for self-discipline that underlies all of the
opinions; it is present in those opinions which defended the free
exchange of knowledge in affairs. Santayana stood apart from the
field of economics, yet he stated the philosophic basis of economic
success. "... [A]nd it is no accident that the Anglo-Saxon race ex-
cels in commerce and in the commercial as distinguished from the
artistic side of industry, and that having policed itself successfully it
is beginning to police the world at large. It is all an eminence in
temper, good-will, reliability, accommodation."' 5 Walter Bagehot
stated the difference that "accommodation" makes between brisk
trade and stagnant trade: "Our current political economy does not
sufficiently take account of time as an element in trade operations;
but as soon as the division of labor has once established itself in
the community, two principles at once begin to be important, of
which time is the very essence. These are:
First: That as goods are produced to be exchanged, it is good
that they should be exchanged as quickly as possible.
Second: That as every producer is mainly occupied in produc-
ing what others want, and not what he wants himself, it
is desirable that he should always be able to find, without
effort, without delay, and without uncertainty, others who
want what he can produce.' 6
The reconciliation of the contradictories which arise between
the individual and the state presented a different task. Justice
Holmes' approach to it is therefore different. Justice Holmes rests
thereon on unperturbed, independent, enlightened judiciary acting
in the tradition of a clear doctrine of justice. Justice Holmes knew
his history; he knew the story of the Roman Republic. In these
opinions, there is calm confidence in the people and in the Govern-
ment: ". . . the best test of truth is the power of thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
14 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (dissent).
15Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States. Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, New York.
16 Bagehot, Lombard Street, A Description of the Money Market, in The
Works of Walter Bagehot, assembled by James B. Batterson, The Travelers
Ins. Co.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out."' 7 Emerson had written in The Sovereignty of Ethics: "The
idea of right exists in the human mind and lays itself out in the
equilibrium of nature, in the equalities and periods of our system,
in the level of the seas, in the action and reaction of forces."' 8
Emerson tells us that this was an early discovery of the mind; he
refers to it as a doctrine of unspeakable comfort.
Estimates can never reflect Justice Holmes. There is a residuum
that is beyond reflective appreciation. It rests in the relation which
he had to us, to our law, to our Government. He is somebody in
and of himself. That is perhaps why all attempts to classify him
fail. I have singled out of the residuum the application of the
spirit of reconciliation in the law, which means in life. Our democ-
racy, our people are young. They are, therefore, capable of de-
velopment and growth. In the maturer forms which that growth
may reach the law may emerge as something far beyond the liti-
gious. If so, the memory of Justice Holmes will remain in that
world which will at times stir the ashes of his work and find a glow.
17 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissent).
18 Emerson, The Sovereignty of Ethics, in The Complete Works of Ralph
Waldo Emerson. Houghton, Mifflin, Boston.
